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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MORTON DECISION DEPARTS FROM PRIOR CASE LAW BY 
HOLDING THAT UNDER THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURES ACT SECTION 63-46b-16(4) AGENCY EXPERTISE 
CANNOT BE USED AS THE SOLE STANDARD FOR GRANTING 
DEFERENCE TO AGENCY DECISIONS. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Morton International, 
Inc., v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, 163 
Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (filed June 24, 1 9 9 1 ) , has altered the standard 
of review set forth in prior case law with respect to court re-
view of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, §63-46b-l through 2 2 . The 
Supreme Court has departed from prior case law by noting in 
Morton that nowhere in §63-46b-16 is a reviewing court author-
ized to grant deference to an agency determination solely on the 
basis of expertise. 
. . . nothing in the language of section 63-
46b-16 or its legislative history suggests 
that an agency's decision is entitled to de-
ference solely on the basis of agency exper-
tise or experience. Indeed, there is no 
reference to agency expertise or experience 
in the statute or the statute's legislative 
history. Rather, in granting judicial relief 
when an "agency has erroneously interpreted 
or applied the law," the language of section 
63-465-16(4) clearly indicates that absent a 
grant of discretion, a correction-of-error 
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standard is used in reviewing an agency's in-
terpretation or application of a statutory 
term. Therefore, to the extent that our 
cases can be read as granting deference to an 
agency's decisions based solely on the agen-
cy's expertise and not on a statutory delega-
tion of authority, section 63-46b-16(4)(h ) (i ) 
constitutes a break from prior law. Id» at 
10. 
Rather than rely on agency expertise as a basis for granting 
deference to agency d e t e r m i n a t i o n s , the Supreme Court held in 
Morton that Section 63-46b-16 requires the reviewing board to 
look at the statute at issue to discover if a grant of discretion, 
either express or implied, was made: 
. . . It is clear from the wording of section 
63-46b-16 that an agency's statutory con-
struction should only be given deference when 
there is a grant of discretion to the agency 
concerning the language in question, either 
expressly made in the statute or implied from 
the statutory language. Id. at 12. 
Tasters either misread or mischaracterized the Morton deci-
sion in its Petition for R e h e a r i n g . Tasters a r g u e s , in direct 
contradiction to the language of Morton quoted above, that the 
Supreme Court held in Morton that agency expertise is the deter-
mining factor in deciding whether or not it is appropriate to 
grant deference to an agency d e t e r m i n a t i o n . This misapplication 
comes from Tasters citing passages not from Morton's final hold-
ing but from the portion of the decision discussing the Court's 
past treatment of the issue. 
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Furthermore, Tasters cites Bennett v, Industrial Com'n of 
Utah, 726 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986) in making its argument that 
no deference should be given Board of Review determinations of 
employee/independent contractor status because "resolution of the 
issue is not benefited by commission expertise or experience. 
. . ." This Court specifically overruled Bennett on this issue, 
however, in another case where the central issue was employee/ 
independent contractor status: 
We recognize that the Utah Supreme Court 
enunciated a less deferential standard of 
review in Bennett. . . . It is apparent, 
however, that Bennett is an abberation in 
which the applicable standard of review is 
misstated. . . . Virtually all cases, both 
prior to and since Bennett, apply the inter-
mediate "reasonable and rational" standard 
established in Utah Department of Adminis-
trative Services [Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. 
v. Pub. Serv. C o r n ^ 6b8 PT2d 60l (Utah 
1983)] to the Industrial Commission's inter-
pretation and application of the operative 
provisions of the Employment Security Act and 
worker's compensation statutes (Cites omit-
ted) (p. 482, footnote 1 ) . 
Adele's Housekeeping v. Department of Employment Security, 7 57 
P.2d 480 (Utah App. 1 9 8 8 ) : 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court acknowledged in Morton that 
practically speaking it would make little difference in many 
cases whether or not agency expertise is used as a means of 
determining the appropriateness of deference to agency d e c i s i o n s . 
This, however, may not have a signifi-
cant effect on the standard used to review 
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agencies' statutory interpretations and ap-
plications of their own s t a t u t e s . In many 
cases where we would summarily grant an 
agency deference on the basis of its exper-
tise, it is also appropriate to grant the 
agency deference on the basis of an explicit 
or implicit grant of discretion contained in 
the governing s t a t u t e . Id. at 1 1 . 
This is true in the matter before the Court. Whether this 
Court looks at the Industrial Commission's expertise in deciding 
employee/independent contractor status or whether it looks at the 
statutory language granting discretion to the Commission in 
this matter, it is clear deference should be given to the Board 
of Revi ew's deci si on. 
POINT II 
SECTION 35-4-22(j)(5) EXPLICITLY GRANTS DISCRE-
TION TO THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IN MAKING DETER-
MINATIONS OF E M P L O Y E E / I N D E P E N D E N T CONTRACTOR STA-
T U S . 
The Supreme Court in the Morton decision acknowledges that 
n[t]he legislature, in many instances, has explicitly granted 
agencies discretion in dealing with specific statutory t e r m s . " 
Id. at 11. As an example of an explicit grant of discretion, the 
court cites the language of Section 59-12-104(16) which: 
. . . provides for "sales or leases of ma-
chinery or equipment purchased or leased by 
a manufacturer for use in new or expanding 
operations (excluding normal operating re-
placements . . . as determined by the com-
mi ssi on ) ." Id . at 1 1 . 
The statute at issue in Tasters, § 3 5 - 4 - 2 2 ( j ) ( 5 ) , grants dis-
cretion to the Industrial Commission by using similar language 
to that in § 5 9 - 1 2 - 1 0 4 ( 1 6 ) . Section 35-4-22(j) (5) states: 
Services performed by an individual for wages 
or under any contract of hire, written or 
oral, express or implied, are considered to 
be employment subject to this chapter, unless 
it is shown to the satisfaction of the comis-
sion that the individual is an independent 
contractor . (Emphasis added .) 
As already pointed out in the Brief of Respondents, there 
is other language in §35-4-22(j)(5) which explicitly grants the 
Commission discretion in making determinations of employee/ 
independent contractor status. Section 35-4-22(j)(5) provides 
that "the Commission shall analyze all of the facts in subsec-
tions A through T." (Emphasis added.) "Analyze" is a general 
term, asking the Commission to "study or determine the nature 
in relationship of the parts by analysis." (See Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary.) The yery term "analyze" acts as a grant 
of judgment power to the Commission. 
Section 35-4-22(j)(5) also dictates that the Commission make 
a ruling that an individual is an independent contractor "if the 
weight of the evidence supports that finding." 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "weight of evidence" as: 
The balance or preponderance of evidence; in-
clination of the greater amount of credible 
evidence, offered in a trial, to support one 
side of the issue rather than the other. 
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It is up to the trier or reviewer of facts (the Commission 
in this case) to take all the evidence and weigh it to determine 
whether one conclusion or another should be reached. This is not 
a neat mathematical p r o c e s s , but a more subjective one based on 
credible e v i d e n c e . The Legislature's requirement that the Com-
mission "weigh the evidence" is therefore a grant of d i s c r e t i o n . 
§3b-4-22(j ) (b ) further directs the Commission: "The follow-
ing factors are to be considered, if a p p l i c a b l e . " This language 
again expressly gives the Commission the task of making deter-
minations and is further evidence of the Legislature's intent to 
grant the Commission discretion in making d e t e r m i n a t i o n s of 
employee/independent contractor s t a t u s . 
When the Legislature leaves issues open for future resolu-
tion, as in the case of § 3 5 - 4 - 2 2 ( j ) ( 5 ) , Morton follows prior case 
law by dictating that an appellate court is not to substitute its 
own judgment for that of the a g e n c y . 
. . . Indeed, both the legislative history to 
section 63-46b-16 and our prior cases suggest 
that an appellate court should not substitute 
its judgment for the agency's judgment con-
cerning the wisdom of the agency's p o l i c y . 
When there is no discernible legislative in-
tent concerning a specific issue the legisla-
ture has, in effect, left the issue unre-
solved. In such a case, it is appropriate to 
conclude that the legislature has delegated 
authority to the agency to decide the issue. 
Such an approach is particularly appropriate 
when it is reasonable to assume that the leg-
islature intended the agency to have some 
discretion in dealing with the statutory pro-
vision at issue. Id. at 1 2 . 
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POINT III 
UNDER MORTON, WHEN THERE IS A STATUTORY GRANT OF 
DISCRETION AND DEFERENCE TO THE AGENCY DECISION 
IS THEREFORE REQUIRED, THE REVIEWING COURT WILL 
UPHOLD THE AGENCY DETERMINATION IF IT IS REASON-
ABLE AND RATIONAL. 
This Court's affirmance of the Board of Review's decision 
in this matter was based on its finding that the Board's approach 
in interpreting §35-4-22(j)(5) "[does not] exceed the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality," Tasters, Ltd., Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Employment Security, Case No. 900451, filed June 19, 
1991, page 5. (Emphasis added.) And that: 
Tasters has not met its burden of demonstrat-
ing the Board's application of the statute 
exceeded the bounds of reasonableness . . • 
the approach taken by the Board in applying 
Utah Code Annotated, §35-4-22(j)(5) was a 
reasonable and rational one." _I^, page 7. 
(Emphasis added.) 
This reasonableness standard is the same one used by the Supreme 
Court in the Morton case, once it was determined deference to an 
agency determination was required due to a legislative grant of 
discretion. The Supreme Court in Morton held: 
Given the language of Rule 865-19-85S, the 
discrepancies between Rule 865-19-85S and the 
statutes Morton cites, and the conflicting 
case law, the Commission's determination that 
"The shells of Morton's facilities do not 
constitute equipment is not unreasonable. 
Therefore, the Commi ssi on's determi nati on 
will not be disburbed." Page 20. (Emphasis 
added.) 
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CONCLUSION 
Deference to the Board of Review's ruling in this matter is 
appropriate because of the express statutory grant of discretion 
in §35-4-22(j)(5) to the Commission to make determinations of 
employee/independent contractor s t a t u s . 
This Court appropriately applied a "reasonableness" standard 
of review in this matter and its ruling should not be altered 
by the changes in standard of review outlined by the Morton case. 
Respectfully submitted this lr*6^ day of August, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
EMMA R. THOMAS 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General 
By. 
Emma R. Thomas 
Attorney for Respondents 
Board of Review 
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